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All of us, I believe, are extraordinarily active and creative 
intellectually when we are very young.  Somehow, in the first few 
years of life, we acquire an identity, a consciousness of self; we 
discover, or create, a whole view of the world, a cosmology; and we 
learn to understand speech, and to speak ourselves.  And we 
achieve all this without any formal education whatsoever.  
Compared with these mighty intellectual achievements of our 
childhood, the heights of adult artistic and scientific achievement 
all but pale into insignificance.  It is reasonable to suppose that 
there is a biological, a neurological, basis for our extraordinary 
capacity to learn when we are very young.  It probably has to do 
with the fact that our brains are still growing during the first few 
years of life.  It is striking that there are things that can only be 
learnt during this time.  If we have not had the opportunity to learn 
to speak by the age of twelve, we will never really learn to speak.  
Lightning calculators all begin to acquire their extraordinary 
arithmetical skills when very young.  Some things, it seems, 
become too difficult for us to learn as we grow older.  In our early 
childhood we are forced, by our situation, to be creative 
philosophers and metaphysicians, preoccupied by fundamental 
issues.  One has only to think of the endless questioning of young 
children to appreciate something of their insatiable hunger to 
know, to understand. 
 
The tragedy is that formal education so rarely helps us to 
recognize and to develop our early profound intellectual 
experiences and achievements.  Instead of encouraging our 
instinctive curiosity to develop into adulthood, all too often 
education unintentionally stifles and crushes it out of existence. 
 
Academic inquiry ought to be the outcome of all our efforts to 
discover what is of value in existence and to share our discoveries 
with others.  At its most important and fundamental, inquiry is the 
thinking we engage in as we live, as we strive to realize what is of 
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value to us in our life.  All of us ought both to contribute to, and to 
learn from, inter-personal public inquiry.  This two-way traffic of 
teaching and learning ought to start at the outset, when we first 
attend school.  Young children, at school, need to be encouraged to 
tell each other about their discoveries, their experiences, their 
thoughts and problems.  The teacher needs to encourage both 
speaking and listening.  Such a class or seminar, devoted to the co-
operative, imaginative and rational exploration of problems 
encountered in life, ought to form a standard – even a central and 
fundamental – part of all education, science and scholarship, from 
primary school to university. 
 
If this were the case, then we might all discover how to use 
science and scholarship so as to develop our own thinking – and 
living.  Telling others of our problems and ideas – and listening to 
others tell of theirs – would help us to discover and to value our 
own thinking.  It is all too easy to dismiss our most serious and 
original thinking – those moments of bafflement, surmise and 
wonder – as mere wordless feeling, irredeemably private, 
signifying little.  This is especially the case in childhood.  
Unarticulated, our thinking is liable to become neglected, stagnant, 
forgotten.  If it is to flourish it is vital that we develop and 
constantly practise the difficult art of putting what we feel and 
think into public words.  An education that gave an intellectually 
fundamental role to the development of this art would not only 
stimulate the growth of personal thinking, it would also enable us 
to discover vital inter-connections between our personal thinking 
and public scientific and scholarly thought.  Academic education 
would be not an imposition but an invitation to participate from 
the outset. 
 
I do not want to exaggerate.  Education of this person-centred, 
participatory kind already exists, to some extent, in both the arts 
and the sciences.  Teachers of literature, drama and the other arts 
appreciate that art serves, as it were, a double purpose.  As we 
enhance our understanding and appreciation of literature, so too, 
incidentally, we may enhance our understanding of ourselves and 
of others.  By exploring, in novels and plays, imaginary people 
living imaginary lives, we can achieve a freedom to explore aspects 
of ourselves without the embarrassment or torture of public self-
exposure.  Furthermore, in order to improve our understanding of 
literature it is important that we try our hand at writing, which can 
enhance our powers of self-expression and our self-understanding.  
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Analogous remarks can be made about drama, art, music, dance.  
And again, in science education at its best, it is appreciated that it 
is not just scientific results that need to be taught, but also, and 
perhaps most fundamentally, scientific problems.  It has long been 
appreciated that in order to understand science it is essential to do 
it. 
 
What is missing in all this is an appreciation of the central 
and unifying role of philosophy in all of education – philosophy 
pursued as the co-operative, imaginative and rational exploration 
of fundamental problems of living.  Philosophy pursued in this way 
would effortlessly bridge the gulf between science and art, science 
and the humanities.  All other parts of the curriculum – the 
physical and biological sciences, mathematics, geography, history, 
politics, literature, theatre, religion, etc. – could quite naturally 
and understandably emerge out of, and feed back into, the central, 
unifying enterprise of philosophy pursued as the open, rational 
exploration of fundamental problems.  The very problem of how to 
unify all the diverse aspects of the world into a coherent, 
understandable whole could itself be recognized and discussed.  
The world we live in is a more or less inter-connected whole: it is 
not experienced as being split up into physics, chemistry, biology, 
history, literature, religion, and so on.  Setting out to improve 
children's knowledge and understanding of the world in 
specialized, dissociated fragments, without any indication as to 
how the fragments fit together or, worse, without even an 
indication of the existence of the problem, is in itself an appallingly 
anti-rational and alienating thing to do.  It amounts to the 
imposition of a sort of intellectual schizophrenia.  It sets up a 
barrier between personal thinking and departmentalized academic 
thought, resulting in mutual distrust rather than mutual 
enhancement between these two kinds of thought.  In important 
respects, academic learning cannot promote – it can only sabotage 
– coherent, rational thought about problems of living in this one, 
real, inter-connected world. 
 
Failure to teach philosophy to five-year-olds, as a central, 
unifying part of the curriculum, is the result of mistaken 
assumptions about both children and philosophy. 
 
Philosophy, it is assumed, is too difficult and esoteric a 
subject to be taught to five-year-olds.  Only adults can come to 
grips with such an advanced discipline.  In fact it is, if anything, the 
 4 
other way round.  Above all, it is young children who are 
compelled, by their situation, to be highly active and creative 
philosophers, daily concerned with fundamental problems about 
the nature of life and the world.  Most adults have long ago settled 
in their minds, in one way or another, fundamental questions 
about the nature of life and the world.  It is particular, detailed, and 
specialized problems that preoccupy adult minds.  The mere fact 
that most adult teachers neither recognize, nor feel any discomfort 
concerning, the profound philosophical disorder of the curriculum 
they daily administer to children is itself a blatant indication of the 
unphilosophical character of the adult mind.  Philosophy, one 
might say, is instinctively and naturally a concern of childhood, 
and only rather rarely and artificially still a matter of concern in 
adult life. 
 
This in turn, of course, makes it difficult for adults to teach 
philosophy properly.  The main mistake would be to teach 
philosophy as another academic subject, as a body of recognized 
problems, proposed solutions and debates.  The pupil would be 
expected to learn this up.  This would, of course, miss the point 
entirely.1  For what is needed is, in a sense, not the teaching of 
anything at all, but rather the encouraging of children themselves 
to engage in the activity of articulating and scrutinizing problems 
and their possible solutions.  Furthermore, it would be vital to do 
this in an honest and open-ended way, there being no prohibitions 
on what problems can be discussed, what solutions considered. 
The nature of the universe, war, sex, death, power, money, politics, 
fame, pop stars, parents, school, work, marriage, the meaning of 
life, evolution, God, failure, drugs, love, suffering, happiness: 
whatever it is that the children find fascinating or disturbing, and 
want to discuss, deserves to be discussed.  Where there are no 
known or no agreed answers, the teacher must acknowledge this.  
The teacher must readily acknowledge his or her own ignorance or 
uncertainties.  The main task of the teacher will be to try to ensure 
that the children speak one at a time, that everyone gets to speak, 
and that those who are not speaking, listen.  The teacher will also, 
of course, try to establish a spirit of generosity towards the ideas of 
others, while at the same time encouraging criticism and 
argument.  The main object of the seminar is to enable children to 
discover for themselves the value of co-operative, imaginative, 
rational problem-solving by taking part in it themselves.  Only 
good, experienced teachers could hope to make a success of the 
philosophy seminar run along these lines. 
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The purpose of the seminar is not to promote mere debate.  
Argument is to be used as an aid to exploration and discovery: it is 
not to be used merely to trounce opponents or to win converts – as 
an excuse, that is, for intellectual duelling or bullying.  The seminar 
must not be conducted in such a way that it amounts to overt or 
disguised indoctrination in some creed – however correct or noble 
the creed may be judged to be.  Insofar as a creed is implicit in the 
seminar, it might be put like this: it is proper and desirable for 
people to resolve problems and conflicts in co-operative, 
imaginative and rational ways.  This creed is itself open to 
discussion and critical assessment – along with all other political, 
religious, moral, economic, social and philosophical doctrines.  The 
problem of how to distinguish co-operative discussion from 
indoctrination deserves itself to be discussed when it arises.  Again, 
the seminar is not group therapy.  Its primary aim is not to solve 
the participants’ urgent practical, personal problems (although it 
may occasionally and incidentally help to do this).  Problems can 
be imagined and do not need to be lived.  Ideas can be aired as 
possibilities, and do not need to be believed.  Accounts of personal 
experience are welcomed when relevant to the discussion, but are 
not expected or demanded.  The aim of the seminar is to explore 
possibilities, and not to reach decision about actions.  Unanimity 
does not need to be sought. 
 
It is nothing less than an educational scandal that seminars 
of this type are not a standard part of school and university life, 
available to everyone from the age of five years upwards.  However, 
it is not just that there has been a general failure to organize all 
education around such a philosophy seminar.  Worse still, there 
has been, and still is, a general failure even to see the vital need to 
do this.  The very idea of the philosophy seminar for five-year-olds, 
as indicated here, has generally not been entertained.  A major 
reason for this is that the proper purpose and character of 
philosophy, and of academic inquiry more generally, has long been, 
and still is, radically misunderstood, especially by academics 
themselves. 
 
Academic inquiry is widely taken to have as its proper, basic 
intellectual task the improvement of expert, specialized knowledge 
and technological know-how.  As long as academic inquiry is 
pursued and organized with this basic task in mind, the philosophy 
seminar, as depicted above, can scarcely form a normal, let alone a 
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central, part of university work.  Non-expert, non-specialized 
discussion of our problems of living – however imaginative, 
rational, co-operative and potentially fruitful – cannot contribute 
to the acquisition of expert, specialized knowledge.  Groups 
devoted to such discussion may amount to worthy debating 
societies, group therapy sessions or Quaker prayer meetings: they 
cannot constitute standard academic seminars. 
 
The fault here lies with the orthodox conception of academic 
inquiry.  It is an intellectual and human disaster.  When judged 
from the standpoint of improving specialized knowledge, orthodox 
academic inquiry must, it is true, be judged to be, on the whole, 
both rational and extraordinarily successful.  But when judged 
from the more important and fundamental standpoint of 
improving human welfare, enhancing the quality of human life, 
academic inquiry must be judged to be grossly irrational and 
unsuccessful.  In order substantially to improve the quality of 
human life on earth we need, amongst other things, to get rid of 
war, the threat of war, armaments whether nuclear, biological, 
chemical or conventional, the extreme poverty of the third world, 
tyranny, exploitation and enslavement.  Humanity needs to 
discover how to resolve its local and global conflicts and problems 
of living in more co-operatively rational ways.  But co-operative 
action requires co-operative discussion.  If academic inquiry is to 
devote itself, rationally and successfully, to promoting human 
welfare, then it must give priority to providing such co-operative 
discussion; it must, as a matter of absolute intellectual priority, (a) 
articulate our problems of living and (b) propose and critically 
assess alternative possible solutions, possible co-operative actions.  
Problems of knowledge must be tackled in a subordinate way, 
scientific and technological research emerging out of and feeding 
back into the more fundamental concern with problems of living. 
 
Contemporary academic inquiry, in giving priority to 
problems of knowledge over problems of living, fails to do what it 
most needs to do: create and promote a tradition of thinking 
devoted to resolving human conflicts and problems in co-
operatively rational ways.  In the absence of a general capacity to 
act co-operatively, the mere provision of knowledge and 
technological know-how can do as much harm as good, as the 
twentieth-century record of science and war, and the nuclear arms 
race, so horrifyingly exemplifies. 
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We urgently need, in brief, a new, more intellectually 
rigorous and humanly desirable kind of academic inquiry, one 
which gives priority to helping us realize what is of value in life, 
individually, locally and globally.  This new kind of inquiry gives 
intellectual priority to personal and social (or global) problems of 
living (rather than problems of knowledge) and endeavours to help 
us discover how to act, to live, in progressively more co-operatively 
rational ways, so that we achieve what is genuinely of value to us in 
the circumstances of our lives.  The basic aim is to promote 
personal and social wisdom in life – wisdom being defined as the 
capacity to realize what is of value, for ourselves and others.  
Wisdom, so defined, includes, but goes beyond, knowledge and 
technological know-how.  Given the existence of such a tradition of 
inquiry in the world, there is a real chance that humanity might 
learn how to make steady and substantial progress towards a 
generally happier state of affairs than that which we endure at 
present. 
 
Once the academic community wakes up to the desperately 
urgent need to transform the academic enterprise in this way, so 
that its basic task becomes to promote not only knowledge but also 
personal and social wisdom in life, it will at once become 
blindingly obvious that the philosophy seminar, more or less as 
described above, does indeed need to be put at the heart of all 
inquiry and education, from primary school to university.  
Unfortunately, the academic community, despite being devoted to 
reason and innovation, is in many ways extremely conservative and 
highly resistant to change, especially when it comes to changing 
the overall aims and methods of inquiry.  I am especially aware of 
this, having argued for some thirty years for the urgent need to 
change academic inquiry from knowledge to wisdom: so far I have 
seen few signs of change (see Maxwell, 1976, 1980, 1984, 2000, 
2004).  If we wait for the scientists, scholars and university 
administrators to wake up to what needs to be done, we may have 
to wait for ever.  What we can do, and need to do, is begin with the 
five-year-olds.  Professors may be past it, but five-year-olds are 
not. 
 
The above was written long ago, in 1986, in complete 
ignorance of the philosophy for children movement.  I then 
discovered Gareth Matthews’ delightful little book Philosophy for 
the Young Child (1980), and as a result I laid aside this plea for 
philosophy for five-years-olds on the assumption that the matter 
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was already satisfactorily in hand.  Since then, philosophy for 
children has become a world-wide movement, and it might seem 
that this essay is redundant.  This is not the case, for at least two 
reasons. 
 
First, the philosophy for children movement seems to take 
for granted a thoroughly orthodox, analytic conception of 
philosophy, according to which philosophy is one discipline 
alongside others, concerned with puzzle solving and conceptual 
analysis.  Given this conception of philosophy, it is difficult to see 
why philosophy should occupy a central and fundamental role in 
the curriculum.  What is lacking is an awareness of the need to 
bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of academic 
inquiry as a whole, including philosophy and education, so that the 
basic aim becomes to acquire and promote wisdom, problems of 
living being put at the heart of the academic enterprise.  Once one 
becomes aware of the need to bring about this revolution, it 
becomes clear that the philosophy seminar, along the lines I have 
indicated, ought to be central to all of education.  The philosophy 
for children movement would, in my view, become more credible 
and cogent were it to join forces with the effort to transform 
inquiry as whole so that it takes up its proper task of promoting 
wisdom by rational means.  Only within a genuinely rational kind 
of inquiry devoted to promoting wisdom can the philosophy 
seminar, as I have described it, come to have its proper place and 
role. 
 
Second, in England the national curriculum all but prohibits 
the philosophy seminar as I have depicted it.  Group discussion, 
listening and speaking, and problem solving are, it is true, all 
encouraged, and citizenship and personal, social and health 
education are included.  Furthermore, the curriculum for primary 
education may well be sufficiently flexible to permit something like 
the philosophy seminar to take place in individual schools.  But 
there is, in the national curriculum, no hint that group discussion 
might feed into other parts of the curriculum, into science, history 
or English.  And when it comes to secondary education, the 
curriculum seems to be so rigidly constructed that it seems 
impossible that the philosophy seminar could get elbow room, let 
alone influence the rest of the curriculum. 
 
We need to bring about a revolution in the national 
curriculum here in England, and we need a world-wide revolution 
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in education and academia, so that the philosophy seminar comes 
to play a central role, for five- to ninety-five-year olds. 
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NOTE 
 
1 This mistake is evident in current A-level philosophy 
syllabuses. 
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